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Abstract—Cloud computing services provide a scalable solu-
tion for the storage and processing of images and multimedia
files. However, concerns about privacy risks prevent users from
sharing their personal images with third-party services. In this
paper, we describe the design and implementation of CryptoImg,
a library of modular privacy preserving image processing opera-
tions over encrypted images. By using homomorphic encryption,
CryptoImg allows the users to delegate their image processing
operations to remote servers without any privacy concerns.
Currently, CryptoImg supports a subset of the most frequently
used image processing operations such as image adjustment,
spatial filtering, edge sharpening, histogram equalization and
others. We implemented our library as an extension to the
popular computer vision library OpenCV. CryptoImg can be
used from either mobile or desktop clients. Our experimental
results demonstrate that CryptoImg is efficient while performing
operations over encrypted images with negligible error and
reasonable time overheads on the supported platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is one of the fastest growing technologies.
Gartner research selected cloud computing among the top
10 strategic technology trends in 2015. Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) is a class of cloud computing that allows thin clients,
such as mobile devices or web browsers, to make use of
centrally hosted software services on demand. During the past
few years, there has been a proliferation of commercial SaaS
solutions for various application domains including image
editing. For example, services like Adobe Creative Cloud [1],
and Pixlr [2] allow the user to upload pictures from her
personal computer or mobile device in order to apply different
image enhancements online.
However, image processing in the cloud presents a serious
threat to the user’s privacy. A malicious service provider can
look into the user private photos in order to discover sensitive
information such as identity, friends, visited places, etc. As
privacy is a crucial issue for end users, mitigating privacy
concerns is necessary to increase the adoption of online image
processing services.
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In this paper, we present CryptoImg, a library of modu-
lar image processing operations over encrypted images. We
implemented our operations by extending the OpenCV li-
brary and employing the Paillier cryptosystem [6]. The major
enhancement, which CryptoImg introduces as compared to
previous work in the field, is that CryptoImg can efficiently
perform the needed computations with minimal overhead,
while guaranteeing the secrecy of private images. CryptoImg
omits the need for multiple non-collided servers [3]. Also,
CryptoImg supports different operations including image ad-
justment, spatial filtering, edge sharpening, edge detection,
morphological operations, and histogram equalization over
encrypted images. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to support secure morphological operations besides other
image processing operations in one package.
Recently, Lathey and Atrey [3] introduced a privacy-
preserving method for image processing based on Shamir’s
Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme [4]. This method distributes the
image enhancement task among multiple servers to ensure
privacy. Their solution supports a number of low-level image
processing tasks carried out on encrypted images, such as spa-
tial filtering, anti-aliasing, edge enhancement, and dehazing.
Although this approach allows performing both addition and
multiplication operations over encrypted data, the security of
this model is guaranteed only if the computation is distributed
over n (>1) entities with no more than k among them are
colluding. This model is impractical, as it requires non collud-
ing servers and thus provides only weak security guarantees.
Moreover, they employed different pre-processing for each
secure operation. Therefore, a sequence of secure operations
can not be done without decryption and re-encoding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
defines the problem and threat model. Section III provides
a brief background about Paillier cryptosystem and floating-
point (FP) encoding technique. It also summarizes the related
work. Section IV describes our proposed secure operations in
details. Section V provides our experimental evaluation results.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, first we define the problem statement and
threat model. Later, we describe the system architecture of
CryptoImg.
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Fig. 1: System Architecture of CryptoImg.
A. Problem Statement
We study the problem of protecting the confidentiality of
private images against third-party services performing image
processing. Our threat model assumes that the clients trust
their own hardware and locally-running software programs, but
they do not trust third-party remote servers. Although the pres-
sure of market competition forces service providers to perform
the requested image enhancement operations correctly, these
servers might threaten the user’s privacy by abusing the given
images to uncover private information for their own business
interest. By giving the server access to nothing more than
encrypted images, our system is secure under the “honest-but-
curious” adversary model.
We rely on the Paillier cryptosystem which is provably
secure using the hardness of decisional composite residuosity
assumption [6]. This means that it is infeasible for any attacker
to break the encryption unless he has an efficient algorithm
that can solve a family of problems that are computationally
intractable. Compared to previous work in image processing
over encrypted images, our solution provides better security
guarantees than the model adopted by [3], [8], which requires
more than one server and becomes insecure against colluding
servers.
B. System Architecture
As shown in Fig. 1, CryptoImg consists of two parties:
client and server. The client represents either an individual
personal computer (PC) or mobile device (Mob), while the
server is a powerful system offering processing and storage
services over the cloud. The client owns private image data
and desires to make use of the server image processing
services, while keeping the confidentiality of the submitted
image against unauthorized access. To achieve this goal, the
client encrypts the image before submitting it to the server.
Using the homomorphic encryption (HE) properties of Paillier
cryptosystem, the server can perform operations over the
encrypted image without revealing the source plain-image. The
output encrypted image is sent back to the client to decrypt
and display the processed image.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
This section provides a brief background about Paillier
cryptosystem, discusses the used encoding scheme, and sum-
marizes the related work.
A. Paillier Cryptosystem
HE is a form of encryption which permits secure computa-
tions over encrypted data. We denote the encryption of mes-
sage m using the public key pk as JmK. Paillier cryptosystem is
an additive HE scheme as it provides a public-key operation⊕z
over two encrypted integers which is equivalent to their plain-
text addition, as shown in (1). It also supports a self-blinding
operation ⊗z which allows multiplication of encrypted integer
by a plaintext scalar d, as shown in (2) ∀m1,m2 ∈ Zn.
DEC(Jm1K⊕z Jm2K) = DEC((Jm1K× Jm2K)mod n2)
= (m1+m2)mod n (1)
DEC(Jm1K⊗z d) = DEC(Jm1Kd mod n2)
= (m×d)mod n (2)
B. From Integers to Floating Point (FP) Numbers
Paillier cryptosystem is defined over a group of positive
integers Zn, while in practice many operations should happen
over real numbers. Therefore, an encoding function EN with
minimal quantization error is needed in order to perform
secure computation over FP numbers. We define φadd and
φmul as the error introduced due to addition and multiplication
operation, as shown in (3) and (4), respectively. Optimal
encoding mechanism should have φmul = φadd = 0. Prior
work over encrypted data represents FP numbers through
multiplying by a large scaling factor as done in [5]. However,
this representation has φmul equals the scale factor after each
multiplication operation. Thus, it can not be used with arbitrary
number of multiplication operations over FP numbers.
φadd := abs(EN(m1+m2)− (EN(m1)+EN(m2) )) (3)
φmul := abs(EN(m1×m2)− (EN(m1)×EN(m2) )) (4)
Therefore, we have chosen to use the same approach de-
veloped by Google’s Encrypted BigQuery Client [9], which
represents FP number by a mantissa m and a non-positive
exponent e. A FP number in plaintext is represented by pair
(m, e). In encrypted domain, FP number is represented by a
pair of an encrypted mantissa using paillier cryptosystem and
an unencrypted exponent (JmK, e). Self blinding and additive
homomorphic over floats are denoted by ⊗ and ⊕, respec-
tively. By using the addition and multiplication primitives
( ⊕z, ⊗z ) of the Paillier cryptosystem, we can perform FP
numbers addition and multiplication, as shown in Protocol 1.
Also, signed numbers are handled by assigning the ranges
[0,n/3] and [n/3,2n/3] for positive and negative numbers,
respectively, Whereas the remaining range (2n/3,n) is used
for overflow detection. Subtraction accordingly over encrypted
floats is denoted by 	.
Protocol 1 Secure FP Numbers Processing.
Multiplication: JcK= a⊗ JbKJmcK= ma⊗z JmbK
ec = ea+ eb
Addition: JcK= JaK⊕ JbK
if ea ≤ ebJmcK= JmaK⊕z (Baseeb−ea ⊗z JmbK), ec = ea
if ea > ebJmcK= JmbK⊕z (Baseea−eb ⊗z JmaK), ec = eb
C. Related Work
Recently, various privacy preserving algorithms using HE
have emerged in different domains including: information
retrieval, data mining, and image processing. Shortell and
Shokoufandeh addressed the problem of privacy-preserving
image processing by using fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) to process the data while encrypted [5]. They used
their solution to implement brightness/contrast filter. Also,
they extended FHE to support FP numbers via multiplying
each value by a factor of 10d , where d depends upon the
precision of the desired decimal digits up to which we want
to process the FP numbers. However, the reported execution
time was 15 minutes on a scaled down image and three hours
on the original image.
Hu et al. [10] proposed a double-cipher method to imple-
ment nonlocal means (NLM) denoising over encrypted images.
As the NLM operation includes exponentiation, which is a non
linear operation, the authors encrypted the plain image with
two different cryptosystems before sending to the cloud. The
first one was the Paillier scheme, in order to enable the mean
filter, and the other was obtained by a distance-preserving
transform, in order to enable the nonlocal search. However,
their proposed method had higher communication overhead,
due to outsourcing two different ciphers for every image. They
also enabled only a single type of image processing operations.
Moreover, secure multi-party computation (SMC) has been
utilized to protect privacy of outsourced images. Hu et al.
implemented two secure linear filtering protocols [8]. The first
one relied on a combination of rank reduction and random
permutation, whereas the second one is based on random
perturbation with the help of a third party entity. In the
context of secure image retrieval, Zhang et al. proposed a
secure image retrieval method for cloud computing, which is
implemented based on content-based image retrieval (CBIR)
framework [13].
Hsu et al. proposed a privacy-preserving realization of
the scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT) method based on
Paillier cryptosystem [14]. However, their proposed method
introduced errors due to the rounding operation in their
Gaussian filter coefficients, which were adjusted as integers
because their Paillier cryptosystem can only operate in the
integer domain. We handle this issue by using appropriate
encoding technique.
IV. SECURE OPERATIONS IN ENCRYPTED DOMAIN
The following subsections give details about the supported
image processing operations by CryptoImg.
A. Secure Image Adjustment
Image enhancement is done by applying transformation T
on an image I, which produces the resultant image R. We
denote the individual pixels values in images I and R by i
and r, respectively. Therefore, the relationship between input
pixels i and output pixels r can be represented by r = T (i).
CryptoImg supports brightness control and image negation.
For brightness control, the client requests to adjust the bright-
ness of his image by adding value v, encrypting it along with
the image pixels using his public key, pk, and sends both the
encrypted value JvK and encrypted image JIK to the server.
The server computes the encrypted values of output pixels for
all pixels in the image using JrK= JiK⊕ JvK. Then, the server
sends the encrypted image back to the client who will decrypt
using its secret key sk.
Furthermore, CryptoImg supports secure Image negation
where the server computes the encrypted output pixel accord-
ing to JrK = JL− 1K	 JiK, for all pixels in input image with
grey levels in the range [0,L−1].
B. Secure Noise Reduction
Noise reduction and anti-aliasing operations are essential
for many applications like medical, and remote sensing im-
ages processing. Smoothing filter in spatial domain is very
common operation for anti-aliasing and noise removal, which
is equivalent to a low pass filter (LPF) applied in the frequency
domain. We denote the output image by Ispt whose individual
pixels (u,v) are computed by performing average filter repre-
sented in (5). The filter f (u,v) is applied first to m×n patch
around (u,v) pixel, then the intensity values of this patch are
averaged.
JIspt(u,v)K= 1m×n ⊗ m,n∑u=1,v=1 f (u,v)⊗ JI(u,v)K (5)
The challenging part in mapping the average filtering oper-
ation to encrypted domain (ED) is how to map the division
operation, which may result in a non integer result. As the
original Paillier cryptosystem supports only operations over
integers, we used our encoding technique, described in sub
section III-B. It enables us to multiply by the FP term
1/(m× n). Furthermore, arbitrary spatial filter masks can be
applied in (5), as we do not restrict the filter value to be
positive integers. On the other hand, authors in [5] did not
support negative value in the filter mask.
C. Secure Edge Detection And Sharpening
Edge detection is an extremely important step facilitating
high-level image analysis [15]. Edges are pixels where image
brightness changes abruptly, therefore gradient operators are
commonly used to discover such pixels in the image. Cryp-
toImg supports different kind of edge detection operators as
Prewitt, Sobel, Robinson, and Kirsh, which are able to detect
edges in different directions. Those operators approximates the
first derivative. Client sends the encrypted image to the server
associated with the required operator ID. Horizontal kernel h1
and vertical kernel h2 are convoluted with the encrypted image
to find encrypted horizontal JGxK and vertical JGyK gradient
components as shown in (6) and (7). The client decrypts the
resultant to find the gradient magnitude G=
√
Gx2+Gy2 and
gradient’s direction Θ= atan2(Gy,Gx).
JGx(u,v)K= m,n∑
u=1,v=1
h1(u,v)⊗ JI(u,v)K (6)
JGy(u,v)K= m,n∑
u=1,v=1
h2(u,v)⊗ JI(u,v)K (7)
Additionally, edge sharpening operation in [5] can be refor-
mulated, as shown in (8) in order to decrease the number
of operation in the encrypted domain. Subtracting the blurred
image ILPF from the original one removes the low pass
frequency component and yields the edge representation of
the original image I. A positive constant, k, is used to control
the amount of sharpening. For high-boost filtering, k is greater
than one, while it equals one in case of unsharp masking.JILPFK can be obtained using (5) using the appreciate mask.
JIshrp(u,v)K= ((k+1)⊗ JI(u,v)K)	 (k⊗ JILPF(u,v)K) (8)
D. Secure Morphological Operations
Morphological operations represent a relatively separate
part of image processing. They are widely used in many
applications, such as document analysis, character recognition,
industrial inspection, and the analysis of microscopic images
in fields like geology, biology, and material science. The
basic idea in binary morphological operations, studied in this
work, is to probe an image I with a pre-defined shape, called
the structuring element B with size m× n . The main two
operations in binary morphology are erosion and dilation.
Based on these two operations, more complex morphological
operations can be computed, such as opening, closing, and
shape decomposition. Protocol 2 describes the secure erosion
and dilation operations. The erosion threshold value T equals
the number of ones in B. Conversely, the threshold value T is
equal to 1 to perform dilation.
Protocol 2 Secure Morphological Operations.
1: Client sends JIK to the server associated with the requested
structuring element B.
2: Server performs JL(u,v)K= ∑m,nu=1,v=1JI(u,v)K.
3: Server sends JLK to the client.
4: Client decrypts JLK using his private key. Then, Image
thresholding is applied on L using threshold value T .
E. Secure Histogram Equalization
Histogram equalization is a commonly used operation for
contrast enhancement. It aims to create an image with equally
distributed brightness levels over the whole brightness scale.
As shown in Protocol 3, this goal is performed by calculating
the cumulative image histogram Hc for the input image. Then,
a monotonic pixel brightness transformation T (p) is applied
such that the desired output histogram is almost uniform
over the whole brightness scale. Original image histogram is
denoted by H and its size is G. Image size is w× `. Intensity
level is denoted by p.
Protocol 3 Secure Histogram Equalization.
1: Client sends encrypted image histogram H.
2: Server computes the brightness transformation T (p) as
following:JHc(0)K= JH(0)KJHc(p)K= JHc(p−1)K⊕ JH(p)K,where p= 1,2, · · ·G−1JT (p)K= (G−1)/(w× `)⊗ JHc(p)K.
3: Server sends JT K.
4: Client decrypts and applies T (p) on each image pixel.
V. EVALUATION
CryptoImg is implemented in C++ using GMP and NTL as
an extension to the popular computer vision library OpenCV.
We also developed an Android client application, which is
implemented in Java. Our implementation of Paillier cryp-
tosystem extends the work of [16] to introduce the FP support
described earlier in SubSection III-B. For our experiments,
we used a Intel Xeon(R) desktop machine with 8 cores
at 2.20 GHz running Ubuntu 64-bit operating system. Our
Android client application is installed on Nexus 5 (NX) mobile
device, with Quad-core 2.30 GHz Krait 400 CPU.
The rest of this section provides our CryptoImg evaluation
in terms of the introduced error, computation time on both
client and server, and communication overhead.
A. Visual Output Evaluation
We performed a number of experiments to evaluate the
performance of different operations supported by CryptoImg.
We applied the operations to a number of gray level images
from the public CVG-UGR gray level image database [17];
The dimensions of every image is 512 × 512 pixels and
every pixel is represented by 8 bits. In case of morphological
operations, selected binary images from another database [18].
Fig. 2 shows the result of the proposed methods using a
precision of 10−8. The precision determines the exponent of
the encoded FP number using blogBase precisionc. Due to space
limit, we only show one output for each method. Fig. 2-
a represents the original images, which is encrypted using
user Paillier public key and submitted to the server to obtain
image negation. Fig. 2-c shows the output after applying image
negation in encrypted domain (ED). On the other hand, Fig. 2-
b shows the output of image negation in the plaintext domain
(PD) using normal OpenCV APIs. Fig. 2-d through Fig. 2-
f show the same for brightness adjust. Additionally, Fig. 2-i
shows the decrypted output after applying secure averaging
operation on Fig. 2-g using a 3×3 filter. The visual effect of
Negation Brightness LPF Edges Sharpening Dilation Equalization
(a) Input (d) Input (g) Input (j) Input (m) Input (p) Input (s) Input
(b) PD Output (e) PD Output (h) PD Output (k) PD Output (n) PD Output (q) PD Output (t) PD Output
(c) ED Output (f) ED Output (i) ED Output (l) ED Output (o) ED Output (r) ED Output (u) ED Output
Fig. 2: Visual output evaluation for operations applied in PD and ED using 10−8 precision level.
secure blurring and noise removal is compared with Fig. 2-h
which is the normal average filter in the PD.
For the sake of testing edge detection techniques, a simple
Sobel filter is used to detect edges in Fig. 2-j the outputs of the
ED and PD are shown in Fig. 2-l and Fig. 2-k, respectively.
On the other hand, edge sharpening with k = 1.0 is applied
on Fig. 2-m. Edge sharpening in ED and PD are shown in
Fig. 2-o and Fig. 2-n, respectively. Also, an example for the
morphological operations is represented by applying a dilation
operation on Fig. 2-p. The output in PD and ED are shown
in Fig. 2-q and Fig. 2-r, respectively. Finally, Protocol 3 is
applied on Fig. 2-s to perform histogram equalization in ED.
The result is shown in Fig. 2-u which is compared with PD
outputs in Fig. 2-t.
By comparing the output of operations in both encrypted
and plain domains, we find that all our secure methods
introduce zero error except LPF and edge sharpening, which
introduce a low error at higher precision. Table I shows
the effect of choosing the precision level in the secure LPF
and edge sharpening operations. The error is calculated by
comparing the output in PD and ED. Based on that, we choose
10−8 as a reasonable precision.
TABLE I: Precision effect on the introduced error.
Precision Average Error Standard Deviation
LPF Sharpening LPF Sharpening
10−2 0.768 0.644 0.471 0.485
10−8 0.145 0.012 0.352 0.112
10−10 0.145 0.012 0.352 0.116
B. Computation Time
We used two different implementation for Paillier cryptosys-
tem for PC and Mob. Table II shows the computation time
that CryptoImg takes to encrypt/decrypt images using different
key sizes. The encryption/decryption process is done pixel by
pixel. Therefore, if the original image size is n×n×8 bits and
a k bit key is used, the size of the encrypted image would equal
approximately 2k× n× n bits. That represents approximately
a k/4 expansion factor. Histogram equalization operation does
not require the encryption of all pixels. Only the histogram is
encrypted, as explained in Protocol 3.
Table III shows timing results of running our protocols
using a PC or Mob clients with the configuration given in
Section II-B. For obtaining a high level of security, we set
the Paillier key length to of 1024-bits and 2048-bits in all
scenarios. Edge sharpening is the most expensive operation,
as it needs successive computations. The relatively high cost
of the encryption process could be amortized by storing an
encrypted version of the image on a cloud storage. The image
is encrypted once and could be used as an input for many
secure image processing operations.
C. Discussion
Based on our results, we conclude that performing oper-
ations over encrypted images adds more cost in terms of
computation time, communication, and storage. The added
cost increases as the length of encryption key increases.
However, our protocols add minimal computation overhead,
which is orders of magnitude less than prior work (e.g. [5])
and also minimal communication overhead, only one round
between the client and server.
TABLE II: Execution Time (sec) of the Paillier encryption/decryption of image using different key sizes on both personal
computer (PC) and mobile device (Mob) clients. We used 512×512 image for PC and 256×256 image for Mob.
Key Size 256 512 1024 2048
Encrypt-PC 23.9164 156.905 1154.29 7670.49
Decrypt-PC 1.39223 1.93554 4.06813 9.62313
Encrypt-Mob 13 73 575 3701
Decrypt-Mob 10 48 325 2268
TABLE III: Execution Time (sec) of the proposed operations using 1024-bit and 2048-bit keys on both personal computer
(PC) and mobile device (Mob) clients. The server is modeled as the personal computer. We used 512×512 image.
Operation PD ED
Pre-processing Server Post-processing
PC Mob 1024-bit 2048-bit PC Mob
Negation 0.00122 0 0 42.4737 137.925 0 0
Brightness 0.00108 0 0 0.81994 2.39777 0 0
LPF 0.00763 0 0 180.508 609.199 0 0
Sobel filter 0.00642 0 0 147.567 482.195 0.0012 0.0940
Sharpening 0.00977 0 0 238.257 807.528 0 0
Erosion 0.00009 0 0 4.04937 10.8085 0.0006 0.0198
Dilation 0.00008 0 0 4.04937 10.8085 0.0005 0.0198
Equalization 0.00174 0.00182 0.177 0.01446 0.04835 0.0007 0.0290
Also, it is worth mentioning that not all image process-
ing operations can be directly implemented in CryptoImg.
For instance, operations that require sorting/comparison, such
as median filtering [19], would require more communica-
tion rounds between the client and server. Some gray-scale
transformations, such as contrast manipulation, would not be
feasible in ED as they rely on the knowledge of the original
intensity value of the pixel to be able to map this value to
another intensity value. More complicated algorithms, such as
SIFT, could be supported in ED at the cost of adding more
communication rounds between the client and server, a similar
approach was used by [14].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced CryptoImg, a library of modular
privacy preserving image processing operations over encrypted
images based on the homomorphic properties of Paillier cryp-
tosystem. Secure operations, such as image adjustment, spatial
filtering, edge sharpening, edge detection, morphological op-
erations, and histogram equalization, are safely outsourced to
third-party servers with no privacy issues.
We presented how this operations can be implemented with
much less time overhead, and single communication round.
Moreover, CryptoImg can be used from either mobile or
desktop clients with low client-side overheads. Experiments
show the efficiency of our proposed library. In the future, it
will be interesting to explore the feasibility of using the current
secure operations as building blocks to support more complex
algorithms.
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